The main ambition of this chapter is to identify and explore a series of challenges that the phenomenology of delusions poses to our systematic thinking about autonomy. For the sake of the argument, we shall understand autonomy in terms of intentional agency over time (see, for example, Bratman 2007) and will not expand on the possible interactions between this and alternative conceptions, which either take an ahistorical perspective and define autonomy as a distinctive relationship to one's motives at the time of action (Frankfurt 1971) , or integrate further criteria, such as responsiveness to (good) reasons (Watson 1975) or accordance with particular values (Hill 1991) . 1 An implication of this methodological choice is that the challenges at issue will have no immediate bearing to emancipatory accounts which define autonomy as a particular social-relational status and therefore have no apparent reason to take delusions as likely failures of autonomy per se, independently of specific institutional contexts (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000). 2 In other words, the following discussion is primarily aimed at theories which conceive autonomy as an agency rather than a status concept. 3 The central claim is that in order to avoid circularity, such theories should be able to address the subsequent challenges from delusion. This becomes clear if we consider the compelling 1 For a comprehensive analysis of these alternatives, see Buss (2008) .
Introduction
The main ambition of this chapter is to identify and explore a series of challenges that the phenomenology of delusions poses to our systematic thinking about autonomy. For the sake of the argument, we shall understand autonomy in terms of intentional agency over time (see, for example, Bratman 2007) and will not expand on the possible interactions between this and alternative conceptions, which either take an ahistorical perspective and define autonomy as a distinctive relationship to one's motives at the time of action (Frankfurt 1971) , or integrate further criteria, such as responsiveness to (good) reasons (Watson 1975) or accordance with particular values (Hill 1991) . 1 An implication of this methodological choice is that the challenges at issue will have no immediate bearing to emancipatory accounts which define autonomy as a particular social-relational status and therefore have no apparent reason to take delusions as likely failures of autonomy per se, independently of specific institutional contexts (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000) . 2 In other words, the following discussion is primarily aimed at theories which conceive autonomy as an agency rather than a status concept. 3 The central claim is that in order to avoid circularity, such theories should be able to address the subsequent challenges from delusion. This becomes clear if we consider the compelling 1 For a comprehensive analysis of these alternatives, see Buss (2008) .
2 This is because such accounts take interpersonal dynamics to be a constitutive part rather than a circumstance only of autonomy. A partial parallel from the phenomenology of delusion is folie à deux in which people living with someone who has delusions (for example within a family) get caught up in their delusional world but only so long as they remain in close and largely exclusive proximity with the person concerned (eg Gelder, Mayou and Cohen 2001, p. 394 ).
2 intuition according to which 'insanity' is an obvious case where autonomy as specified above has broken down (see, in particular, Wolf 1987) . What seems to be implied in it however is that 'insanity' is definable independently of whether it compromises autonomy or not. Psychosis as a central mental disorder and delusion, its central symptom seem to provide the required theoretical leverage. The thought is that, unless delusion is conceived as theoretically independent from autonomy, we would end up with a vicious circle: defining 'insanity' as lack of autonomy and then turning back to clarifying autonomy as a state where autonomy is not lacking.
Yet, as we shall argue drawing on Fulford (1989) 4 the following challenges from delusion suggest that delusions are implicitly understood in terms of various kinds of breakdowns of intentional agency. 5 Hence, in order to avoid circularity both in defining autonomy and delusions, we need to explicitly address the putative failures of autonomy as presented by the logical topography of delusions, encompassing: their centrality (Challenge 1), their diverse logical range (Challenge 2), and non-pathological instances (Challenge 3). We take these challenges in turn, first setting out and illustrating the relevant features of delusions and then expanding on the implications for theories of autonomy. We conclude by spelling out several caveats that emerge from the discussion and briefly indicating the relevance of the analysis to contemporary policy and practice in mental health.
The Centrality of Delusions
Our first challenge from delusions for theories of autonomy is to address their central legal and ethical significance consistently with their correspondingly central place among other kinds of 3 psychopathology. In this section we fill out this challenge with an illustrative series of brief case examples starting with the central place of delusions in the map of mental disorders.
The Central Psychopathological Significance of Delusions
Delusions are the paradigm symptoms of the most serious forms of mental disorder, the psychotic disorders. These disorders include both organic psychoses such as the dementias and other conditions caused by gross pathology affecting the brain (brain tumours, brain infections etc) and non-organic or, as they are called 'functional' psychoses, such as schizophrenia and the affective psychoses (including hypomania, some forms of depression, and bipolar disorder). We will be giving examples of these and of a variety of other disorders in the course of this chapter. As these examples will illustrate, the psychoses as a whole are characterised by the presence of delusions and of related symptoms, such as hallucinations.
Psychotic disorders (and with them delusions) are the most serious kinds of mental disorder in two senses, contingent and constitutive. Contingently, the psychotic disorders carry the highest risk of premature death (by suicide or, far more rarely, homicide). Constitutively, psychotic disorders are the most serious mental disorders in the sense that the delusions and related symptoms by which they are defined are in turn characterised by a particularly profound disturbance of rationality called in descriptive psychopathology, 'loss of insight'.
Like many other psychopathological concepts, psychotic loss of insight, although identifiable with a high degree of reliability in the form of delusions and related symptoms (Wing, Cooper and Sartorius 1974) , remains a much contested concept (Lewis 1934; Perkins and Moodley 1993; Amador and David 2004) . Essentially, what loss of insight means in this context is that people with psychotic disorders (characteristically) fail to recognise that there is anything (mentally) wrong with them. We can see this by comparing the delusions of guilt arising typically in people with severe depression with the obsessions of guilt that occur in people with obsessive-compulsive disorders. The 'insanity defence', as it is nowadays called, builds on a long history: the intuition that people who are insane are not responsible for their actions and hence that they are 'mad not bad' dates back to pre-classical times and is evident in a wide variety of both Western and non-Western cultures (Robinson 1996) . A similar intuition underpins the central place of delusion-defined psychotic disorders in involuntary treatment. (Fulford and Hope 1996) . Involuntary treatment could thus in principle be used for anyone with a mental disorder who presents a risk to themselves or others. In practice, though, as in Mr AB's case, the use of involuntary treatment is mainly restricted to the psychotic disorders (Sensky, Hughes and Hirsch 1991; Fulford and Hope 1994) .
Challenge 1: The Centrality of Delusions
The first challenge presented by delusion for theories of autonomy is thus to address its autonomy-impairing nature consistently with its central legal/ethical and psychopathological significance as the characteristic symptom of psychotic mental disorders.
Autonomy and the Centrality of Delusions
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Drawing on the preceding discussion of the insanity defence and theory and practice of involuntary psychiatric treatment, it is compelling to infer they both presuppose the idea that mental disorder in general and delusions in particular are forms of internal obstacles to autonomy. 7 In extremis, these obstacles lead to loss of autonomy, where an agent can no longer be treated as the source of at least some of his or her actions. This is particularly clear in the case of the insanity defence understood as grounds for full excuse rather than a mitigating factor. For, in order to make sense of this notion, we have to think of delusion-motivated behaviour as resulting in outcomes or states of affairs that are merely caused by a delusional agent but are not actions attributable to him or her (Davidson 1980 Following this line of thought, we are able to explain the distinction between compulsion-and addiction-motivated behaviours which could allow for mitigation but not full excuse, on the one hand, and on the other, delusion-motivated behaviours which as outlined earlier are eligible for full excuse (Morse 2000; Watson 1999) . Whilst the former class of behaviours undermine intentional agency over 7 This notion builds on the distinction between internal and external obstacles to freedom which Feinberg (1980) sets apart from the distinction between positive and negative obstacles to freedom or, obstacles to positive and negative freedom respectively that was originally set out by Berlin (1958) .
time but are compatible with voluntary individual actions, the latter seem to exhibit a deeper mismatch between effective intentions and resulting actions which locates them at the margins of voluntariness and beyond.
The contrast with addiction and compulsion indicates that the centrality of delusions has to do with the idea of a breakdown of rather than mere impediment to intentional agency and confirms the initial account in terms of internal obstacles to autonomy. However, as soon as we take into consideration the implicit social context of human action, it becomes apparent that the idea of delusions as internal obstacles to autonomy could provide a vehicle for oppression from outside.
For it is open to misuse as a putative rationale for interventions limiting a person's negative freedom whilst at the same time concealing the restrictive or, liberty-diminishing character of these interventions. 9 Berlin's critique of positive freedom illustrates well the underlying concern:
"The perils of using organic metaphors to justify the coercion of some men by others in order to raise them to a "higher" level of freedom have often been pointed out. But what gives such plausibility as it has to this kind of language is that we recognise that it is possible, and at times justifiable, to coerce men in the name of some goal… This renders it easy for me to conceive of myself as coercing others for their own sake, in their, not my, interest. I am then claiming that I know what they truly need better than they know it themselves. What, at most, this entails is that they would not resist me if they were rational and as wise as I and understood their interests as I do. But I may go on to claim a good deal more than this. I may declare that they are actually aiming at what in their benighted state they consciously resist, because there exists within them an occult entity -their latent rational will, or their "true" purpose -and that this entity, although it is belied by all that they overtly feel and do and say, is their "real" self, of which the poor empirical self in space and time may know nothing or little; and that this inner spirit is the only self that deserves to have its wishes taken into account. Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their "real" selves…" (1958, pp. 179-180) This concern could provide a plausible motivation for attempts to define delusions as involving some form of cognitive impairment instead of a breakdown of intentional agency. As we note under the second challenge below, much empirical research effort has gone into attempts (thus far inconclusive)
to identify one or more particular kinds of cognitive impairment specific to delusion. An account of delusions in terms of cognitive malfunctioning (if such were to prove possible) would apparently warrant the kind of theoretical independence from an implicit conception of autonomy brought up in the Introduction. In turn, this would arguably help construe a notion of delusion as an internal obstacle to autonomy that is resistant to coercive uses like that identified in the quotation above.
The appeal of this approach stems from a particular understanding of cognitive performances as objectively measurable and, in this respect, safer to assess than other aspects of the life of the mind, deemed to be merely subjective and, therefore, arbitrary. As we note in the next section, Anthony Flew (1973) relied on just this kind of supposed objectivity in his account of delusion as an excuse in law. However, even if we assume that this way of thinking about cognition is correct, it cannot help avoid the intuition that delusions are breakdowns of intentional agency. This becomes clear, if we take into consideration recent work in virtue epistemology the central claim of which is that knowledge is an apt, creditable performance (Greco 2003; Sosa 2007; Zagzebski 2001 ). This analysis clarifies and expands upon our ordinary intuitions, according to which cognitive tasks are something we do, a category of actions subject to appraisals to which mere physiological processes, such as digestion are not. Following this line of thought, it is persuasive to interpret even the simplest cases of cognition where we merely 'get things right' as instances of intentional agency (Radoilska 2010) . Therefore, even if delusions could be defined as cognitive failures, this would not get us away from the conclusion that they present breakdowns of intentional agency but merely specify where these breakdowns are likely to occur. At all events, the significance of intentional agency for understanding delusions becomes even clearer if we look in a little more detail at just what exactly delusions are.
This brings us to our second challenge.
The Logical Range of Delusions
Textbook definitions of delusion often take them to be a particular kind of false belief. For instance, To all appearances Mr S's belief that anyone could be using his mind for his thinking in this way is clearly false and as the standard definition further requires, it is a culturally atypical belief which (on further questioning ) proved to be resistant to argument and appeals to evidence. The evident falsity of this and other delusions furthermore ties in with their legal and ethical significance as outlined under Challenge 1. For instance, Flew (1973) argued that the objective falsity of delusions is the one sure defence against the (ab)use of psychiatric authority for the sake of social control rather than medical treatment.
The problem though is that the standard definition although indeed covering some kinds of delusion is very far from covering them all. In the first place, many (perhaps most) delusions are not culturally Othello syndrome based on delusions of infidelity was made notwithstanding the fact that those making the diagnosis were aware at the time they made the diagnosis that Mr A's beliefs far from being false were as to the essential fact true.
That delusions may be true beliefs in this sense was pointed out many years ago in a series of detailed case reports of cases of the Othello syndrome (Shepherd 1961) . But the logical point that delusions
are not essentially false beliefs as to matters of fact is shown perhaps even more decisively by the occasional variant of hypochondriacal delusion, the paradoxical delusion of mental illness. Health Act had he not accepted ordinary reassurance that people who were mentally ill did not get 'put away' and was thus no longer considered to be at risk of suicide.
Paradoxical delusion of mental illness
Delusions as Value Judgements
Cases of delusions as true beliefs are unusual (though no less conceptually significant for that). Mr.
MI's story is not a philosophical thought experiment but rather based on the story of a (biographically disguised) real patient. There is though a further kind of delusion that runs counter to the false belief of the standard definition and that is entirely commonplace, namely evaluative delusions (Fulford 1991) . One example of such a delusion is the evaluative delusion of guilt. Delusions of guilt may take the form of beliefs as to matters of fact. We had an example of such a delusion with Mr SD in Case 1:
Mr SD you will recall thought he was responsible for starting a war. But delusions of guilt may also take the form of value judgements. 
Different logic, same practice
The gap between the standard definition of delusion as a false belief and the actual range of logical forms of delusion that we find in practice could thus hardly be more dramatic. Delusions as our examples illustrate may certainly take the form of false beliefs; but they may also take the form of true beliefs; and they may not be beliefs at all at least as to matters of fact, but value judgements, negative and/or positive in sign. Delusional value judgements furthermore unlike delusional true beliefs are as we have indicated entirely commonplace. And there is a further twist to the story here in the fact that all these different kinds of delusion have the same implications for practice. A delusion is a delusion as it were, regardless of its logical form, when it comes to treatment (Fulford 1989, chapter 10 We come back then to the question we raised at the end of Challenge 1 as to the precise sense in which psychotic disorders disturb intentional agency over time, but now with the added challenge of accommodating the full range of logical forms of delusion.
Challenge 2: The Logical Range of Delusions
10 For example, Gelder, Mayou and Cohen (2001, p. 13) define delusion as "... a belief that is firmly held on inadequate grounds, is not affected by rational argument or evidence to the contrary, and is not a conventional belief that the person might be expected to hold given his educational and cultural background." The authors go on to spell out some of the problems with this definition including the fact that delusions may occasionally not be false beliefs.
11 Garety (2004) 
Autonomy and the Logical Range of Delusions
The diverse logical types of delusions pose a problem for accounts of delusions in terms of objective falsehood and resistance to facts. Such accounts could be seen as a follow-up of the attempts to confine delusions to problems with cognitive functioning in order to avoid subjectivity. However, the variety of delusions covering both factual inaccuracies and evaluative distortions puts into question the effectiveness of this follow-up strategy. 12 For it would be able to account only for the former but not the latter cluster of delusions. This is essentially why Fulford (1989) , pointing to the parallel between the logical range of delusions and the corresponding logical range of reasons for action, argued for an agentic rather than narrowly cognitivist account of delusions.
13
We can take this argument still further though in recognising that leaving aside evaluative delusions, even some instances of the latter, factual type of delusion may be difficult to accommodate to an 'objective falsehood' account. Examples include cases, such as the Othello syndrome (Case 6 above) where a delusion is known to be true by those making the diagnosis. This kind of delusions is similar to Gettier cases of true justified belief that nevertheless does not amount to knowledge, to the extent that in order to explain what goes wrong in both instances, we need to tap into richer conceptual resources than the notion of facts or objective reality as being 'out there' independently of our epistemic endeavours (Gettier 1963; Zagzebksi and Fairweather 2001) . As indicated in the previous section, virtue epistemology offers the required conceptual resources; however, they lead to re-12 A related point has been made by Richard Gipps in Gipps and Fulford (2004) . 13 Thus, the reasons we (as agents) give for our actions mirror the logical range of delusions in taking the forms respectively of factual beliefs (true or false) and of value judgements (positive or negative).
The parallels here are set out in Fulford (1989, ch. 10 ).
interpreting cognitive functioning in terms of intentional agency, an outcome that the accounts of delusions at issue apparently aim to avoid.
Where does this leave us with respect to concerns about the coercive potential of an account of delusions in terms of inner obstacles to autonomy? In fact, the diversity of delusions may not be bad news about objectivity, understood as non-arbitrary application of the concept. As pointed out in the context of Challenge 1, the interest of confining delusions to instances of cognitive malfunctioning comes from the prospect of avoiding arbitrariness in defining what counts as a delusion. For arbitrariness could easily lead to employing redress of internal obstacles to autonomy as pretence for introducing external obstacles to it.
This valid concern seems misinterpreted by approaches which present delusions as involving objective falsehood and resistance to facts as opposed to subjective viewpoint and evaluative judgement. The root of the problem is that these approaches do not deliver objectivity as nonarbitrariness which is at the heart of the valid concern about coercion but go after a different kind of objectivity that turns out to be both superfluous and unfit for the task, namely, objectivity as mindindependence. For the sake of clarity, this critical point will be broken down into constitutive steps:
1) It is possible to first merge the two conceptual pairs 'objectivity -subjectivity' and 'factvalue' into one, and then redefine the poles of the resulting pair as mutually exclusive, only if it is assumed that objectivity means mind-independence. This is because on alternative conceptions of objectivity, such as non-arbitrariness the expression 'objective value' is not an oxymoron and the predicates 'subjective' and 'objective' could be compatible.
14 2) Accounts of delusions in terms of objective falsehood and resistance to facts do take objectivity and facts to be on the same side of a conceptual gap, on the other side of which are located subjectivity and values.
3) Hence, these accounts are committed to a conception of objectivity as mind-independence.
4)
This conception of objectivity implies that values are by their very nature outside the realm of objectivity for they do not partake in the 'fabric of the world' (Mackie 1977) . Instead, it is up to us to endorse or reject any particular values. Hence, they are bound to remain arbitrary.
5)
Another direct implication of defining objectivity as mind-independence is that along with values, mental states as such also fall outside the realm of objectivity. They only make a proper subject of inquiry in so far as they are stripped from their subjectivity and reduced down to underlying physiological processes, which are part of the 'fabric of the world'.
6)
As argued above, the task that a quest for objectivity in defining delusions is meant to fulfil is to identify non-arbitrary criteria for the application of this concept. Accounts in terms of objective falsehood and resistance to facts fail to carry out this task. What is more, they implicitly deny its possibility. This is because they posit delusions as objectively inexplicable over and above the cognitive or other physiological malfunctioning that delusions may involve. In other words, by substituting the ideal of objectivity as non-arbitrariness with that of objectivity as mind-independence, some accounts of delusion deprive themselves of means to investigate the putative breakdowns of intentional agency which are central aspect of the phenomenology of delusions. For such accounts end up obfuscating the very idea of intentional agency.
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An important consequence of this analysis is the acknowledgement that the logical diversity of delusions does not pose a greater challenge to our systematic thinking because some delusions have evaluative rather than factual content. For, as outlined earlier, either would be just as mysterious if we opt out of the vernacular of intentional agency.
Non-pathological delusions
From everything that we have said under Challenges 1 and 2 it may seem that this third challenge involves a contradiction in terms. How it may be said can delusions be, on the one hand constitutive Simon's story is one of a number of similar accounts collected by Mike Jackson in a study of the differences between psychosis and spiritual experience (Jackson 1997; Jackson and Fulford 1997) . So what should we make of Simon's experiences? Are they delusional?
One way to answer this question is by reference to psychiatry's standard diagnostic tools. Among these, the PSE (Present State Examination) provides a carefully developed diagnostic schedule for identifying key psychiatric symptoms (Wing, Cooper and Sartorius 1974 (Wing, Cooper and Sartorius 1974, pp. 172 -173) Simon therefore according to best practice in psychiatric diagnosis has a primary delusion. But delusions as we indicated above are the constitutive symptoms of psychotic mental disorders.
Correspondingly then, when we turn to the World Health Organisation's International Classification of Diseases (ICD), we find that such delusions persisting, as in Simon's case, for longer than a month are sufficient for a diagnosis of a psychotic disorder, including schizophrenia, hypomania, etc. (1992, p 88).
22
QED, then, you may think. But this is where our third challenge bites. For Simon showed no signs of being ill still less of suffering from a severe psychotic illness. Presented with the outcomes of Simon's story psychiatrists (and others) have a split reaction. Some insist that Simon's story should be understood as an illness albeit one that in his case ran an unusually benign course. Others take Simon's story at face value (and as Simon himself took it) as a story of religious (if idiosyncratic) experience. Both interpretations are possible. As to the illness interpretation, Simon would have strongly rejected the idea that his experiences, which were so formative in his life, should be written off as some kind of pathology, however 'benign'. Such a rejection, though, of there being 'something (mentally) wrong', is, you will recall from Challenge 1, fully consistent with the 'loss of insight' by which delusions are characterised.
As to the religious experience interpretation of Simon's story on the other hand, there is support for this from a perhaps surprising quarter, the main competitor to the ICD diagnostic classification, the Delusions normal and pathological How should this be understood? With challenges 1 and 2 we set up delusion as the constitutive symptom of the paradigmatically autonomy-impairing psychotic mental disorders. Challenge 3 now suggests that delusions although indeed sometimes symptoms of mental disorder may at other times not be pathological at all. This suggestion moreover comes not from a critique of delusion that is external to psychiatry but from the story of a real person (biographically disguised as Simon) interpreted through one of psychiatry's most influential diagnostic manuals, the DSM.
Simon's story is not a one off exception that proves the rule. It is as we said earlier one of a series of similar stories collected originally by Mike Jackson. Jackson and others have subsequently carried out wider epidemiological studies confirming that non-pathological psychotic experiences are widespread in the general population (Jackson 1997; Johns and Van Os 2001) . The British Psychological Society 24 has indeed gone on to publish a platform statement arguing that psychotic experiences as such should be regarded as the basis of a problem solving capacity (2000) . There are perhaps resonances here of traditionally recognised links between madness and creativity (Jamison 1993) . To be clear, there is no suggestion that psychotic disorders are a fiction. Like any other capacity, the capacity for psychotic experience may sometimes 'go wrong'. But there is no necessity here, contingent or analytic.
Delusions and other psychotic experiences for all their significance as symptoms of mental disorder may also be not only normal but positively life enhancing.
Challenge 3: Non-pathological delusions
The third challenge for philosophical theories of autonomy is thus to clarify how pathological (autonomy-impairing) delusions are different from non-pathological (autonomy-preserving) delusions.
Autonomy and non-pathological delusions
Non-pathological delusions offer a critical perspective onto the first two challenges which build upon the idea that there is a strong link between delusions and different kinds of breakdowns of intentional agency. In particular, they prompt us to look again into the notion of internal obstacle to autonomy we introduced earlier. This is not to say that in so far as delusions turn out to be beneficial for a person, they cannot present internal obstacles to his or her autonomy. For good luck is compatible with a breakdown of intentional agency.
This becomes clear if we consider a thought experiment set out by Linda Zagzebski (2001) in which a benign manipulator ensures that a prospective knower believes only truths. In this scenario, the manipulator monitors the belief formation of the manipulated agent and intervenes, unbeknown to her, only if she is on the verge of acquiring a false belief. The prospective knower ends up holding only 25 true beliefs. Yet, her epistemic agency is undermined by the implicit manipulation of her reasoning.
Hence, fortunate end results could be brought about by internal obstacles to intentional agency.
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In light of these observations, it is more promising to interpret the challenge from non-pathological delusions as an indication that there is an implicit success criterion at work in the previous two challenges and in particular that effective intentional agency over time is the reference point when defining what goes wrong with delusions. Having ruled out cases, in which things just happen to work out well for delusional agents, it is important to clarify whether an underlying success criterion adds to the legitimate concerns about coercion we identified earlier or, on the contrary, could help to address them. Practically, it may be thought, a sufficient response to any concerns raised by the recognition of an implicit success criterion is the development of more effective ways of balancing complex and conflicting values in decision making (as in the model of values-based practice 17 ). But the very effectiveness of this practical move in turn points us back to the need for a more robust theoretical understanding of how values come in to judgements of autonomy if we are to avoid it being used for abusive ends. The following discussion will not aim to provide anything in the way of a comprehensive theory but rather to identify and briefly comment upon three prima facie plausible interpretations of the agential success which seems to distinguish non-pathological delusions from pathological ones: conventionalist, particularist, and universalist.
As its name suggests, the first alternative proposes to construe agential success in conventional terms.
To put it crudely, an agent is successful on this view in so far as he or she manages to secure the kind of goods that are generally considered as enviable by his or her society or social group. This interpretation is consistent both with a notion of mental disorder as involving significant impairment of social or occupational functioning and diagnostic guidelines advising to pay particular attention to the cultural backgrounds of prospective psychiatric patients. The plausibility of a conventionalist approach to agential success in the context of delusions stems from its ability to provide an additional perspective onto putative clinical cases. The thought is that this extra viewpoint could act as a 26 corrective to potentially coercive applications of clinical authority in deciding which delusions are pathological. However, the conventionalist interpretation leaves unattended concerns about societal rather than medical arbitrariness in defining mental disorder. In doing so, a conventionalist understanding of agential success may offer a platform for the resentment of majorities by inadvertently allowing them to discredit unpopular conceptions of the good and penalise dissenters.
That this is no merely theoretical possibility is indicated by for example attributions of mental disorder to political dissidents on the basis of 'delusions of reconstruction' in the former USSR (Fulford, Smirnov and Snow 1993) .
The second, particularist interpretation of agential success could be seen as an improvement on the latter issue. This is because the success criterion it employs is the set of goals that an agent endorses, independently of the ways in which the projects at issue are seen from an observer's perspective. This would be closer to Simon's case. However, both the appeal and the limitations of the particularist approach stem from an instrumental conception of practical rationality, with its strict distinction between facts and values, means and ends (Foot 1972) . 18 Like accounts of delusions in terms of objective falsehood and resistance to facts, the particularist interpretation locates the relevant questions about intentional agency at the level of beliefs and handling of evidence. The crucial question however is not whether they reflect correctly an external reality conceived as independent of the human mind. What matters instead is whether an agent's set of beliefs and overall reasoning promote rather than impede the pursuit of objectives he or she has set for him or herself. An apparent advantage of the particularist interpretation is that the notion of internal obstacle of autonomy becomes directly linked to a fist-person perspective. 19 This could be seen as a reliable barrier to coercive uses of this notion aiming to impose a third-perspective on delusional experiences as ultimately authoritative. However, this advantage comes at a rather unexpected price: the final ends of action are assigned beyond the confines of practical rationality. In this sense, they are made irrelevant 18 See also Radoilska (2007, pp. 109-128) for a critical analysis.
19 On the significance of distinguishing first-personal from third-personal considerations about autonomy, see chapter 9 of this volume by Hallvard Lillehammer. 27 to ascertaining either agential success or possible breakdowns of intentional agency. For these ought to be conceived in purely executive as opposed to evaluative terms 20 in order to forestall coercive uses of the notion of internal obstacle to autonomy as specified by the particularist strategy. The distinction between the two kinds of failures of intentional agency is helpfully brought out by the following illustration:
"There is no doubt but that there are different kinds of cases of contrary-to reasonness, and not surprisingly it is possible to contravene rationality in more than one way at the same time. I once read of a burglar who was caught because he sat down to watch television in the house he was burgling, thus adding the contrary-to-reasonness of imprudence to that of dishonesty. Because his actions were faulty in that he did not hurry away with the swag, we can say, if we like, that he should have done so." (Foot 1995, p. 7)
The particularist interpretation of agential success considers as problematic only the "contrary-toreasonness" due to imprudence or in terms of the distinction we introduced earlier executive rather than evaluative failures of intentional agency. As pointed out at the start of the discussion, this may be considered as an advantage for the particularist strategy since it rules out a moralised account of agential success. In doing so, it seems to avoid the danger of facilitating external obstacles to autonomy under the guise of redressing internal ones. Unfortunately, there is good reason to doubt that this danger has been avoided. By choosing to treat the ultimate ends of action as tangential to a person's success as an agent, the particularist interpretation becomes unable to track down a central case of obstacle to autonomy which has external origins but internal manifestation: the internalisation of oppressive social norms (Stoljar 2000) . The underlying worry is that by focusing merely on how an agent carries out his or her plans the particularist interpretation lets inappropriate influences in the formation of these plans to slip under the radar. Yet these kinds of influences grossly undermine a 20 This contrast draws on the distinction between executive and evaluative practical commitment introduced by Mele (1995, p. 71) .
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person's intentional agency, for the affected plans are not up to him or her in the required sense for voluntariness as spelt out in the context of Challenge 1.
The third, universalist interpretation is in a position to address not only executive, but also evaluative obstacles to autonomy. This is because it conceives agential success as a twofold achievement: not only is an agent's plan brought to fruition, the plan itself also has to be worth undertaking in a sense that cannot be fully reduced to the agent's endorsement. However, the latter requirement seems open to the objection that it peddles a moralised view of intentional agency and could easily serve the purposes of coercion. For if agential success applies to instances where the ends of action are worthwhile, not merely effectively implemented, a third-person or observer's perspective becomes as important as the first-person or agent's perspective.
A possible way of addressing this worry is to impose stringent conditions on the kinds of thirdpersonal considerations that could be given such weight. For instance, it is plausible to argue that nonarbitrary third-personal considerations about agential success should stop at the formal as opposed to substantive features of the plans under consideration. The idea is to be able to locate unobvious obstacles to autonomy, such as self-loathing and related effects of internalised oppression, and to make sure that the plans the agent pursues are sufficiently up to him or her in order to qualify as
voluntary. Yet, the underlying theoretical objective cannot be achieved unless the features of a plan for action yield themselves to a neat distinction to formal, on the one hand, and substantive, on the other. In light of our earlier observations about fact and value, and means and ends, there is good reason to doubt that this strategy would be entirely successful. For the kind of voluntariness implicit in the notion of a plan being up to the agent may not be easily separable from a notion of reasonableness. This becomes clear if we take into consideration an intuitive test for discovering whether a particular option has been freely chosen or imposed. In this respect, the inherent choiceworthiness of the option offers just as valuable an indication as the availability of possible alternatives. This outcome sends us back to the initial concern about non-arbitrariness in defining both agential success and possible breakdowns of intentional agency.
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Concluding remarks
The three challenges that we identified and explored in this chapter point to an inescapable yet elusive association between delusions on the one hand and various kinds of breakdowns of intentional agency on the other. In particular, the centrality of delusions helped clarify both the appeal and the coercive potential of thinking about delusions in terms of internal obstacles to autonomy, in the presence of which an action is no longer up to the agent but merely caused by him or her. In turn, the parallel between the logical diversity of delusions and the corresponding logical diversity of reasons for action led us to the need to distinguish between two separate conceptions of objectivity that may be at work in existing accounts of delusions. This distinction is significant, for it suggests that the difficulty in defining delusions is not due to the evaluative as opposed to factual content of some delusions but to a potentially misleading conception of objectivity as mind-independence. Finally, non-pathological instances of delusions enabled us to put a spotlight on a success condition that is implicit in the notion of a breakdown of intentional agency. Yet, none of the three initially plausible interpretations of agential success that we looked into could satisfy the legitimate ideal of objectivity as nonarbitrariness that emerged from the discussion. This outcome is not entirely aporetic as it opens up a promising line of inquiry for clarifying putative breakdowns of intentional agency within a viable objectivity conception. Such a line of inquiry would both draw critically on the features of delusion and, in turn through such initiatives as values-based practice aim to inform policy and practice relative to this most challenging symptom of mental disorder.
